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Federal White Collar Sentencing in the United States – A Work in Progress
(May 20, 2012 draft)
By Daniel Richman∗
Between 1980 and today, the US federal system has struggled to deal with the challenges
of sentencing the relatively small number of defendants I shall loosely call “high-end”
white collar offenders. After briefly sketching out this story, I explore the lessons, with
particular attention to the interaction between institutional and procedural structures and
theoretical white collar sanctioning goals. While the precise nature of these institutional
and procedural structures is jurisdiction specific, I hope to highlight the need to consider
such structures when devising an optimal (or, even second-best) sentencing regime.
Introduction:
At first blush, it seems odd for an American contributor to an international
conference on sentencing to focus on “high end” federal white collar sentencing. After
all, federal cases make up a relatively small part of the US criminal justice system. (In
2006, about 1,132,290 people were sentenced for a felony in state courts,1 and 73,009 in
federal courts.2) Even within the federal system, white-collar cases of all sorts are a
relatively small part of a criminal docket dominated by immigration, drug, and gun cases,
which together comprised nearly 73% of all federal cases in 2009.3 And the “crimes
involving fraud, deceit, theft, embezzlement, insider trading, and other forms of
deception” that accounted for 9.5% of 2009 cases includes a great many offenders and
offenses of the middling sort.4 Moreover, what is meant by “high end” anyway? Does a
vague directional reference allow one to sidestep the longstanding scholarly debate about
defining “white collar crime” 5
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The provisional answer is “yes,” at least when broadly speaking of sentencing
policy. One need not be either rigorous or comprehensive in defining the relevant class
of cases to appreciate the outsized role that the sentences given to the well-off and wellplaced play in perceptions about the fairness and efficacy of American criminal justice.
Whether driven by public interest or schadenfreude, media coverage gives these cases of
financial scandal and public corruption a profile disproportionate to their number. And
the work of Tom Tyler and others6 suggests that this profile and the impressions it leaves
will potentially play a critical role in the legitimization of enforcement efforts more
generally. Indeed, while I make no rigorous argument of historical connection, it is
worth noting that federal sentencing reform and coincided with an intensification in the
federal commitment to pursue the grander white collar offenders – e.g. not simply bank
embezzlers, con artists, and corrupt line actors in the public and private sector – and that
both occurred during the same post-Watergate period of destabilized governmental
authority.7
The story of how the federal system has dealt with high-end white collar
offenders is worth telling. After all, sentencing stories are one of the United States’ most
valuable exports – generally ones that teach other countries what not to do. This one will
show the convoluted path we have take to come – at least with respect to doctrinal
regulation – nearly a full circle, the closest we’ve come to the 1980s that we’ve been in
last three decades. Given how much judicial, adversarial, and legislative energy has been
spent to go what seems like such a short distance, a clear-eyed assessment of the project
seems in order for Americans. Perhaps others can profit from our experience as well.
After briefly sketching out this story, I hope to explore the lessons, with particular
attention to the interaction between institutional and procedural structures and theoretical
white collar sanctioning goals. The precise nature of these institutional and procedural
structures is jurisdiction specific, and my references will be exclusively US federal.8 But
I hope to highlight the need to consider such structures when considering how to sentence
in cases that will regularly test the perceived commitment of any jurisdiction’s sentencing
regime to both equity and equality.
The Nearly Circular Road Taken
Back in the 1970s, Kenneth Mann and his Yale colleagues – who presciently
studied white collar sentencing just as the area started to attract prosecutorial attention –
did a lovely job capturing how judges approached these cases in a regime of unbounded
discretion: Judges certainly considered general deterrence in all their sentences, but in
6

See Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 Ann. Rev. Pscychol.
375 (2006).
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lost by 2904 victims), is a reminder the issues discussed here are arising in state courts with increasing
frequency.
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white collar cases that single goal loomed largest, to the exclusion of all others.9 And
while the need to promote general deterrence often counseled the imposition of prison
time, class considerations counseled restraint: “Most judges share a widespread belief
that the suffering experienced by the white-collar person as a result of apprehension,
public indictment and conviction, and the collateral disabilities incident to convictionloss of job, professional licenses, and status in the community-completely satisfies the
need to punish the individual.”10 Indeed judges had a special empathy for defendants
“whose position in society may be very much like their own.”11
These judicial tendencies were of explicit concern to Congress when it passed the
Sentencing Reform Act in 1984. As the Senate Report explained:
[It is our] view that in the past there have been many cases, particularly in
instances of major white collar crime, in which probation has been granted
because the offender required little or nothing in the way of institutionalized
rehabilitative measures ... and because society required no insulation from the
offender, without due consideration being given to the fact that the heightened
deterrent effect of incarceration and the readily perceivable receipt of just
punishment accorded by incarceration were of critical importance. The placing on
probation of [a white collar criminal] may be perfectly appropriate in cases in
which, under all the circumstances, only the rehabilitative needs of the offender
are pertinent; such a sentence may be grossly inappropriate, however, in cases in
which the circumstances mandate the sentence's carrying substantial deterrent or
punitive impact.12
Once it set to work drafting the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the Sentencing
Commission -- as Commissioner and then-Judge Stephen Breyer later explained -- found
that in white-collar fraud cases
courts granted probation to offenders more frequently than in situations involving
analogous common law crimes; furthermore, prison terms were less severe for
white-collar criminals who did not receive probation. To mitigate the inequities of
these discrepancies, the Commission decided to require short but certain terms of

9

Kenneth Mann, Stanton Wheeler, & Austin Sarat, Sentencing the white collar offender, 17 Am. Crim. L.
Rev. 479, 482 (1980); see also United States v. Bergman, 416 F. Supp. 496, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
(sentencing nursing home operator, prominent sentencing reformer Judge Marvin Frankel noted: “we
continue to include among our working hypotheses a belief (with some concrete evidence in its support)
that crimes like those in this case -- deliberate, purposeful, continuing, non-impulsive, and committed for
profit -- are among those most likely to be generally deterrable by sanctions most shunned by those
exposed to temptation.”).
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S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 91-92 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3274-75.

3
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1999102

confinement for many white-collar offenders, including tax, insider trading, and
antitrust offenders, who previously would have likely received only probation.13
The Guidelines that emerged were primarily driven by the economic “loss” that
judges were charged with calculating, a task that turned out to be enormously complex,
challenging courts to devise methodologies for calculating “intended” or “actual” loss
and, sometimes, “gain.”14 Before long, responding to complaints by the Justice
Department, the Judicial Conference of the United States, and many probation officers
that “sentences for some mid- to high-level economic defendants remained too low in
relation to the seriousness of their offenses,”15 the Sentencing Commission embarked on
an extensive consultative project that culminated in the 2001 Economic Crime Package.
The new regime was designed to slightly lower the sentences of some classes of low-loss
offenders – allowing judges to impose probation in comparatively less serious cases -while raising significantly the sentences of most mid- to high-loss offenders.16
A dog that didn’t bark in the white collar area-- neither back in the 1980s nor (for
the most part) since – was statutory mandatory minimums. The point becomes clear only
when one notices that, in 1984, without even waiting for the Commission to formulate
and implement guidelines for narcotics and violent offenses, Congress established
mandatory minimum sentences for a variety of drug and gun crimes, and has continued to
do so every few years thereafter.17 Perhaps Congress had more confidence in how judges
would sentence white collar offenders. More likely, the issue simply lacked political
salience at the time.
The collapse of the Enron Corporation at the end of 2001 – “barely a month after
the new economic crime guidelines became effective” 18 – brought just this salience.
While Congress did not reach for mandatory minimums, the mandatory status of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines provided the bite for the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
which ordered the Sentencing Commission to consider a variety of enhancements to the
Guidelines.19 As a result of this legislative intervention, base offense levels were
13

Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon Which They Rest,
17 Hofstra L. Rev. 1, 20-21 (1988)
14
Frank O. Bowman, Coping with “Loss”: A Re-Examination of Sentencing Federal Economic Crimes
Under the Guidelines, 51 Vand. L.Rev. 461 (1998); Daniel C. Richman, Fraud Loss Under the Sentencing
Guidelines, chapter in Otto G. Obermaier & Robert G. Morvillo, eds., White Collar Crime: Business and
Regulatory Offenses (1998).
15
Frank O. Bowman, III, Pour encourager les autres? The Curious History and Distressing Implications of
the Criminal Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Sentencing Guidelines Amendments That
Followed, 1 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 373, 388 (2004).
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U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Special Report to Congress: Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal
Criminal Justice System (August 1991).

18
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Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 1104(a), (b)(1), 116 Stat. 745, 808-09; see Bibas at 726-27
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increased in most fraud prosecutions, and the loss table was yet again extended to
increase the presumptive sentence for defendants to whom the largest losses could
somehow be attributed.20
The bite of the Guidelines increased over time, as Congress moved to limit
judicial discretion legislatively. While the Justice Department’s political leaders
similarly sought to tie the hands of line prosecutors, demanding that they hew to the
available facts in their Guidelines calculations, the net result appears to have been an
increase in prosecutorial bargaining leverage, and in sentencing severity.21 Jamie Olis
soon become the poster child for the harshness of the Guideline regime for white collar
cases. A tax lawyer at Dynergy convicted after trial for his role in a scheme to
misrepresent the company’s cash flow, Olis (who had not directly profited from the
illegal transactions) initially received a sentence of more than twenty-four years’
imprisonment because of a loss computation driven by the $105 million stock loss
suffered by one shareholder, the University of California Retirement System.22
The rigid Guidelines regime soon crumbled, however, thanks to the Supreme
Court’s 2005 intervention in United States v. Booker, which held the mandatory
application of the Guidelines unconstitutional and converted the scheme into an advisory
regime.23 Sentencing judges were to consider Guidelines sentencing ranges, but only in
the context of the more general goals set out in 18 § USC 3553(a) – the general
sentencing statute.24 While the Booker Court, invoking Blackstone, celebrated the role of
juries as the “’sacred bulwark of the nation’”25 district courts were the primary
beneficiary of the decision. Yet they didn’t rush to claim the discretionary power that

20

For basics on Federal Sentencing Guidelines loss calculation, see U. S. Sentencing Comm’n, Loss Primer
(Mar 2011) www.ussc.gov/Legal/Primers/Primer_Loss.pdf
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See Daniel Richman, Federal Sentencing in 2007: The Supreme Court Holds – The Center Doesn’t, 117
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Exercise of Discretion, 117 Yale L.J. 1420 (2008); Bibas, supra note __, at 728-30.
22 Simon Romero, Revision of 24-Year Prison Term Ordered in Accounting Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2,
2005, at C3 (noting how had Olis become poster child for excessive punishment for white-collar crime);
see United States v. Olis, 429 F.3d. 540, 548-49 (5th Cir. 2005) (describing misapplication of federal
sentencing guidelines in case and remanding for re-sentencing).
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United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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This statutory provision commanded judges to :impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than
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Booker re-allocated to them. The reasons for this reticence varied across circuits and
within districts.26 Appellate courts were often slow to grant sentencing judges the
freedom envisioned by Booker. Prosecutors sought to prop up the Guidelines regime by
hewing to it in their sentencing advocacy. And sentencing judges themselves may have
come to appreciate the informational value and safety of the Guidelines.
Still, the world indeed changed after Booker, particularly as the Supreme Court
drove the message of sentencing judge discretion home in a series of follow-up cases –
with Pepper v. United States27 the most recent.28 The ebb and flow of white-collar
sentencing doctrine is highlighted in cases like United States v, Tomko,29 where a
plumbing contractor pleaded guilty to tax evasion, admitting to having falsely made the
invoices submitted for the construction of his home seem like a business expense. In
2005, having calculated Tomko’s (advisory) Guideline range to be between twelve and
eighteen months, the district judge, citing Tomko’s “negligible criminal history, his
record of employment, his support for and ties in the community, and the extensive
charitable work he has done,” sentenced him to “three years of probation (the first of
which would be served as home detention), participation in an alcohol treatment program,
250 hours of community service, full restitution, and the statutory maximum fine of $
250,000.”30 The government appealed the sentence and a panel of the Third Circuit
reversed, noting:
We share with the Government concern about the message a sentence of
probation for the indisputably serious offense of willful tax evasion sends to the
public at large and would-be violators. Tomko's sentence of probation included
home confinement in the very mansion built through the fraudulent tax evasion
scheme at issue in this case -- an 8,000-square-foot house on approximately eight
acres, with a home theater, an outdoor pool and sauna, a full bar, $ 1,843,500 in
household furnishings, and $ 81,000 in fine art. The perverse irony of this gilded
cage confinement was not lost on the Government, it is not lost on us, and it
would not be lost on any reasonable public observer of these proceedings,
including those would-be offenders who may be contemplating the risks
associated with willful tax evasion.31

See Richman, Federal Sentencing in 2007, supra note __, at 1411‐18 (elaborating on post‐Booker
dynamics).
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Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. __, 131 S Ct. 1229 (2011).
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US v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).

30
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Soon thereafter, the Supreme Court handed down Gall v. United States,32 and
admonished appellate courts not to apply a presumption of unreasonableness when a
district court imposed a sentence outside the Guideline range. Rather, appellate courts
were to “consider the extent of the deviation,” giving “due deference to the district court's
decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance. The fact
that the appellate court might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was
appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the district court.” The Supreme Court
explained:
"The sentencing judge is in a superior position to find facts and judge their
import under § 3553(a) in the individual case. The judge sees and hears the
evidence, makes credibility determinations, has full knowledge of the facts and
gains insights not conveyed by the record." … "The sentencing judge has access
to, and greater familiarity with, the individual case and the individual
defendant before him than the Commission or the appeals court.” . . . Moreover,
"[d]istrict courts have an institutional advantage over appellate courts in making
these sorts of determinations, especially as they see so many more Guidelines
sentences than appellate courts do.”33
Not long thereafter, the Third Circuit took Tomko’s case en banc and reinstated
his sentence. The Court noted that
a significant number of us, if we were sitting as the district judge, might have
applied the § 3553(a) factors differently had we been the sentencing court. But
this disagreement does not, by itself, demand reversal. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597; see
also United States v. Schweitzer, 454 F.3d 197, 204 (3d Cir. 2006) ("That we may
ourselves have imposed a sentence different from that of the district court, based
on our own de novo assessment of the evidence, is no basis to overturn the
judgment."). We reverse only when we discern an abuse-of-discretion. Looking at
the record before us, we fail to see one here.34
Case-mix variation – particularly the constant increase in immigration cases –
makes it hard to quantify the aggregate effect of the new discretionary regime on

32

552 U.S. 38 (2007) (citations omitted).

33

Gall, 552 U.S. at 51-52.

34

562F.3d at 574. For similar cases, see United States v. Trupin, where the panel initially reversed a tax
sentence as “unreasonable,” 475 F.3d 71, 76 (2d Cir. 2007), but first the Supreme Court and then the
Second Circuit vacated and remanded in the wake of Kimbrough and Gall. 291 Fed. Appx. 449 (2d Cir.
2008); United States v. Gardellini, 545 F.3d 1089 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (upholding probation for tax
conviction). But see United States v. Engle, 592 F.3d 495 (4th Cir. 2010) (reversing probationary/home
detention sentence in tax evasion case, circuit found that district court had failed to consider the relevant
policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission, which treat tax evasion as a serious crime,
emphasize the importance of general deterrence, and reflect the view that under pre-Guidelines practice too
many probationary sentences were imposed for tax crimes).
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sentencing. As Frank Bowman has noted,
the marked decline in average federal sentence beginning in 2008 correlates
directly with the recent explosion in relatively low‐sentence immigration
prosecutions . . . . FY 2008 may have been the year in which judges reading
Kimbrough and Gall first understood that they had a green light to vary from the
guidelines at will, but probably more importantly it also marked the beginning of
a huge upsurge in immigration cases, which went from 17,592 or 24.2% of all
federal cases in 2007 to roughly 30,000 or 35.2% of all cases in 2011. Given that
the average sentence for an immigration case is 16.3 months, as compared to
70.2 months for drug trafficking, 82.7 months for firearms, and 22.7 months for
fraud, the downward pressure exerted on the federal average sentence of this
one change in case mix is immense.35

There is some evidence that both interdistrict and intradistrict variation have
increased.36 Yet the extent of such variation – which one would certainly expect to occur
with the reduction of the Guidelines to advisory status and the substantial relaxation of
appellate review – difficult to determine. Moreover, as Amy Baron-Evans and Kate Stith
have explained, figuring out what variation is normatively troubling is even harder.37
To what extent have sentencing judges made use of their new discretionary
license in white-collar cases? In October 2011, the Chair of the Sentencing Commission,
Judge Patti Saris, reported: “In the Post-Gall Period the rate at which courts imposed a
non-government sponsored below range sentence [in fraud cases] varied from a high of
46.8 percent in the district with the highest rate to a low of 1.4 percent in the district with
the lowest rate, representing a range of 45.4 percentage points.”38 Yet perhaps because
Frank O. Bowman, III, Nothing is Not Enough: Fix the Absurd Post-Booker Federal Sentencing System,
24 Fed. Sent. Rptr. __ (2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2055440

35

36

See Ryan W. Scott. Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity After Booker: A First Look. 63 Stan. L. Rev. 1
(2010); United States v. Whigham, 754 F. Supp.2d 239 (D. Mass. 2010) (Gertner, J.) (critiquing Scott
article). A widely covered judge-by-judge review by the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse for
federal sentencing in 2007-2011 found “extensive and hard-to-explain differences in the sentencing
practices by the judges working in many federal districts.” See Surprising Judge-to-Judge Variations
Documented in Federal Sentencing,” http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/judge/274/ ; see also Mosi Secret, Wide
Sentencing Disparity Found Among U.S. Judges, N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 2012. The Federal Defender
Sentencing Resource Counsel has, however, set out cogent reasons for skepticism about the TRAC
conclusions. See Fact Sheet: TRAC Analysis of Variations in Sentencing Misses the Mark,
http://www.fd.org/pdf_lib/Fact%20Sheet%20on%20TRAC%203.7.12.pdf; see also TRAC’s Report
Claiming “Surprising Judge-to-Judge Variation” Fails to Compare Similar Cases, Relies on Poor Quality
Data, Uses an Unreliable Method of Identifying Case Type, Uses Incorrect Methods of Reporting Sentence
Length, and Contains Numerous Errors, available at http://www.fd.org/odstb/home/2012/05/09/furtheranalysis-of-trac-report-underscores-its-flawed-assumptions
37 Amy Baron‐Evans & Kate Stith, Booker Rules, __ U. Pa. L. Rev. ___ (2012) (forthcoming), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1987041
Prepared Testimony of Judge Patti B. Saris, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, before the Subcomm, on
Crime Terrorism, and Homeland Security, House Jud. Comm., Oct. 12, 2011, at 48, available at
judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Saris%2010122011.pdf

38
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finding a useful quantitative metric is difficult, or because stable patterns have yet to
emerge, assessments of the new regime have largely been driven by anecdote and
rhetoric. In a June 28, 2010, letter to the chair of the Sentencing Commission, Jonathan
Wroblewski, the official who represents the Justice Department on the Commission
focused on high-loss fraud cases as one area in which many judges were imposing
sentences “inconsistently and without regard to the [] guidelines.”39 At January 26, 2011,
Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on new fraud legislation, Republican Senator
Charles Grassley observed:
I'd like to note that regardless of the substantive laws we pass, the investigative
and law enforcement resources appropriated, and the prosecutions brought so far,
criminal fraud will not be adequately deterred unless we revisit the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Booker. . . . Now that the Guidelines have
been held to be merely advisory, the disparity and unfairness in judicially
imposed sentences that we sought to eliminate on a bipartisan basis are returning,
especially in two areas: child pornography and fraud cases of the type we are
discussing today. If potential fraudsters view the lenient sentences now being
handed down as merely a cost of doing business, efforts to combat criminal fraud
could be undermined. 40
In February 2011 testimony to the Sentencing Commission, Preet Bharara, the
U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, observed:
There is concern, based on the experience of some Districts, that more and more,
particularly in the context of high-loss, large-scale fraud cases, there are not
consistently tough and fair outcomes. We have observed - and the Commission's
data have confirmed - that district courts are relying less and less on the
sentencing guidelines, which are now advisory. Some are voicing concern that the
fraud guidelines counsel sentences that are inappropriate to the crime committed.
Others have expressed frustration that the guidelines provide inadequate
assistance in developing intelligent and consistent sentencing decisions in certain
white-collar cases.41
Calls from both the Administration and Legislators for reining in judicial
discretion have continued into 2012. In October 2011, a House Judiciary Committee
Hearing titled “Uncertain Justice: The Status of Federal Sentencing and the U.S.
Sentencing Commission Six Years after U.S. v. Booker,” led off with the subcommittee

39

Letter from Jonathan J. Wroblewski, Office of Policy and Legislation, Criminal Division, U.S Dept’t of
Justice. to the Hon. William K. Sessions III, (June 28, 2010).

40

See Senate Judiciary Committee hearing Jan. 26, 2011. Sen. Charles Grassley statement:

41

Testimony of Preet Bharara. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Public Hearing, Feb. 16. 2011, at 3-4, available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/20110216/Agenda.ht
m

9

chair, Rep. James Sensenbrenner condemning post-Booker “sentencing disparities,” and
the “increasing frequency of downward departures” that favored fraud defendants among
others.42 In November 2011, the head of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division
complained that “[w]ith increasing frequency, federal judges have been sentencing fraud
offenders – especially offenders involved in high-loss fraud cases – inconsistently.43 And
these departmental complaints have continued into 2012.44
Yet others have either tentatively or wholeheartedly embraced the new
discretionary regime. After sentencing the defendant in a faith-based hedge fund fraud to
sixty months’ imprisonment, instead of the 210-262 months suggested by the Guidelines,
Judge John Gleeson – a respected Brooklyn judge and part-time academic – took issue
with the Departmental complaints raised in Wroblewski’s letter:
I don't know why the Department has chosen to complain about fraud
sentences to the Commission but not to the circuit courts of appeals. It has no
reason to believe such appeals would be futile - in the handful of cases in which
the government has challenged sentences based on the sentencing judges'
application of the § 3553(a) factors, it has prevailed two-thirds of the time.
Perhaps, as in this case, the prosecutors who are actually handling the cases in the
courtrooms do not regard the sentences as unacceptable simply because they are
below the advisory Guidelines ranges. In any event, if the problem the DOJ Letter
identifies in this area of federal sentencing in fact exists, there is no need for
reform, as the solution is already available.45
Our story thus ends without resolution or promise of stability. That federal whitecollar sentences have become more severe since the 1980s is clear.46 Equally clear is our
failure to devise an institutional framework for them that is both appropriately nuanced
and fair and that also reflects reasonable enforcement priorities.47 This seems like a good

42

See Hearing, Subcomm. On Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, House Judiciary Committee,
Uncertain Justice: The Status of Federal Sentencing and the U.S. Sentencing Commission Six Years after
U.S. v. Booker,” Oct. 12, 2011.

43

Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer Speaks at the American Lawyer/National Law Journal
Summit , available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2011/crm-speech-111115.html
See Statement of Assoc. Deputy Atty. Gen. Matthew Alexrod before the U.S. Sentencing Comm’n
Hearing on Federal Sentencing Options After Booker, Feb. 16, 2012, available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/20120215‐
16/Agenda_16.htm

44

45

United States v. Ovid, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105390, at *29 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2010).

46

See Ellen S. Podgor, Throwing Away the Key, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 279 (2007),see also
Andrew Weissmann & Joshua A. Block, White-Collar Defendants and White-Collar Crimes, 116 YALE
L.J. POCKET PART 286 (2007) (responding to Podgor’s claims as to sentencing patterns in the last two
decades).
47 As Sam Buell recently noted: “White collar sentencing is tougher, and more predictably tough, than it
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time to return to first principles, perhaps ones with transnational application. I make no
claim to comprehensive coverage. Someone who, for instance, believes that the
government should play a minimal role in policing the financial markets will get an
argument from me in person but not here. Nor will I take on finer line-drawing projects,
like figuring out what should count as criminally corrupt.48 Rather I take the substantive
prohibitions of federal criminal law for granted – fully aware that a high degree of
discretionary enforcement was intended – and explore how we might structure the current
interaction of political and legal actors so as to serve the basic goals of deterring whitecollar crime and promoting some level of retributive justice.
The Tension Between Deterrence and Political Economy Considerations
How should deterrence considerations affect the white-collar sentencing calculus?
Deterrence considerations certainly loom large in discussions of white-collar
sentencing, albeit often with limited rigor. The intuition – and intuition it remains, for
lack of clear empirical evidence, particularly with respect to crimes committed in the
corporate setting – is that word of sanctions gets out pretty quickly to the relevant
community and affects behavior. Sometimes, the government makes affirmative efforts –
the chief criminal tax enforcement official recently spoke of “marketing Justice
Department convictions and sentencing to the tax preparation community”49 and
prosecutorial indictment and conviction press conferences will regularly speak of
“sending a message” -- but the general assumption seems to be that not much officially
sponsored advertising is needed. Certainly, the government has not found the need to
gather executives in a room to hear about the precise sentences received by their peers –
an approach successfully used for targeting gun crime.50
Assumptions that sanctions deter do not of course yield a particular sentence or
even a sentencing range. When, in the course of sentencing an executive convicted of
accounting fraud, a New York federal judge noted “the Government at no time here
presented any evidence or cited to any studies indicating that a sentence of more than
three-and-a-half years was necessary to achieve the retributive and general deterrence
objectives applicable to a case like this one,” he was surely aware of the paucity of

collar sentences that, given the lengthy terms of imprisonment at stake, are perhaps more costly than the
variations that gave rise to federal sentencing reform in the first instance.” Statement of Professor Samuel
W. Buell before the U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Mar. 14, 2012, at 12, available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/20120314/Agenda.ht
m
48 See Lisa Kern Griffin, The Federal Common Law Crime of Corruption, 89 N.C. L. Rev. 1815 (2011).
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Mark E. Matthews, New IRS Publicity Strategy, U.S. Attys’ Bull. 15, 17 (July 2001), available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usab4904.pdf
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See Andrew V. Papachristos, Tracey L. Meares & Jeffrey Fagan, Attention Felons: Evaluating Project
Safe Neighborhoods in Chicago, 4 J. Empirical L. Stud. 223 (2007).
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evidence pointing any particular direction.51 To impose a rigorous burden of proof in this
area is (for better or worse) to pre-determine the result.
In the absence of data, the argument is frequently made that “even relatively short
sentences can have a strong deterrent effect on prospective ‘white collar’ offenders.”52
To this is often added the point, made long ago by Beccaria and sharpened more recently
by Becker and others, that increasing the frequency of enforcement would lead to more
deterrence than increasing the severity of sentences for those actually prosecuted.53 Out
of these premises comes a cogent argument for a regime of frequent enforcement with
relative short prison sentences, which (at least to me) seems intuitively right. A more
complete model would have to consider whether white-collar offenders have
idiosyncratic subjective expectations of the likelihood of enforcement. It may be, for
instance, that “those most likely to have access to white-collar crime opportunities” may
be particularly prone to believe there is “little chance of getting caught and receiving a
severe penalty.”54 For now, however, let us declare the model complete.
Yet even if, though a combination of theory, intuition, and maybe a little data, a
high-frequency/low severity regime emerges as the winner in our deterrence laboratory,
we are far from finished, at least in a world in which that regime’s fundamental premise
of frequency is effectively unattainable -- i.e. the world we live in. For once one turns
from deterrence theory to the domain of political economy, it becomes clear that – at least
under all realistic scenarios – white collar prosecutions will always be pretty rare. Can I
prove this? Not at all. A rigorous demonstration that such prosecutions are rare (or
frequent) requires data on the rate of white collar offending-- how much fraud or
corruption has occurred in any particular period. To be sure, thanks to tax authorities’
audit capabilities, we have some interesting data with respect to tax evasion;55 market
surveillance gives us a sense of insider trading rates, and reporter polling sheds light on
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the prevalence of local political corruption.56 But the focus on criminal intent that
dominates most inquiries into white-collar crime has always posed an insurmountable
challenge to aggregate data collection and base-rate determination.57 Suffice it to say that
intelligent and adequately funded enforcers have never wanted for instances of financial
fraud or political corruption to pursue.58
The same detection issues that stymie data collectors are also a dominating feature
of white-collar enforcement dynamics that (whatever the base offending rate) ensure that
white-collar prosecutions will comprise only a small part (albeit a much talked-about
part) of the criminal docket. This is a world where reporting “victims” have often not
suffered their losses as a result of criminal conduct, and where real “victims” of crimes
are often unaware. It is also a world where, absent some conspicuous scandal or
perceived crisis, the political pressure on enforcement agencies to pursue these cases is
limited, and the demand for “restraint” or “moderation” in the service of capital
formation or local norms great. And it is one in which the opportunity costs with respect
to other criminal priorities—whether violent crime, drugs or immigration—almost always
seem more salient.59
Even in the face of the political economy challenges, one could imagine a variety
of institutional design features that would ensure that zealous and well-funded
prosecutors and enforcement agencies regularly pursued serious cases of financial fraud,
health care fraud, and political corruption regardless of the political climate or public
clamor.60 One could even imagine civil regulators closely coordinating with the criminal
enforcers, contributing their institutional competence to prosecutorial efforts and picking
up those cases meriting less punitive treatment.61 Some may even believe we live in such
a world, and that, were we to reduce white-collar sentences, we could seamlessly increase
enforcement frequency to make up the difference on the deterrence curve. For my part, I
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don’t see anything close to that happening now or in the foreseeable future. And if my
deep skepticism about the possibility of a stable commitment to white collar enforcement
is warranted, we should not expect that increased certainty will accompany decreased
severity.
Be assured that I make no claim that current white collar sentences are at some
normatively “right” level. Indeed, a consequence of the dysfunctional political economy
of white collar enforcement is that when Congress does decide to “go after” white collar
crime, generally in the wake of some well-publicized scandal, it will do so by hiking
sentences without doing much in the way of ensuring that the resources hurried to the
area will stay there. This is the story of the Sarbanes-Oxley sentencing provisions and, as
Carol Steiker has written,62 of other sentencing debacles as well. It may also be the story
behind the Justice Department’s dogged advocacy (again all odds, in a number of district
courts) for adherence to highly punitive guidelines. To the extent that macro political
dynamics drive sentencing levels (as opposed to judicial discretion or the decisions of an
insulated commission), there can be only one direction for sentencing – up, at an
unreasonably steep gradient. The point for now is simply that, given political realities,
the deterrence curve offers but limited support for lower sentences.
Sentencing Actors or Potential Actors
If the foregoing political and enforcement realities make it so difficult to
appropriately incorporate deterrence considerations into white collar sentencing, how can
one devise an optimal sentencing regime, which would presumably consider not just
deterrence but other traditional sentencing goals of desert, individualized treatment, and
proportionality?63 The short answer is that I have no idea. The longer answer is that in
this second- or third-best world, we can start by identifying the contributions and
pathologies of a regime’s actual or potential parts – Congress, prosecutorial hierarchs
committed in wholesale management, and the plea bargaining system that resolves most
cases at the retail level -- and try to balance one troubling tendency against another.
Let us start with Congress, whose tendency to hike sentences when it is outraged,
and not to lower them after the outrage subsides, has already been noted. When these
responses take the form of legislative “noise” – like increases in statutory maximums that
do not affect actual sentences64 – we ought not be too quick to condemn. To be sure,
such measures are often just a species of campaign literature. Yet given that every
legislative enactment has some political opportunity cost, perhaps we ought to embrace
these as useful signals to prosecutors and even judges of political priorities and
commitments. Particularly once we move away from a formal deterrence model and
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consider a messy world in which general jurisdiction prosecutors have to allocate scarce
enforcement resources and in which years of imprisonment are supposed to, at least in
part, convey societal condemnation, weak signals of this sort can help align the
preferences of insulated decision makers with those of the larger community.
What about strong legislative signals that take the form of mandated guidelines or
mandatory minimums? Here we need to weigh the value of democratic accountability
against the pathologies of wholesale legislative sentencing (of which we have
considerable evidence). As Carol Steiker explains,65 the US federal experience has been
not only that legislatively set sentences are carelessly set to begin with but that, once set,
such benchmarks will thereafter provide easy access points for further intervention. Such
intervention will always rachet upward, as legislators will rest secure in the (often
unrealistic) expectation that prosecutorial discretion will prevent conspicuous injustices.
Or at least that Congress won’t take political heat for such injustices.
It has been argued, and perhaps we will soon see, that the vast expenditures
required by a high incarceration regime can restrain legislators’ punitive tendencies.66
No such restraining effort ought to be expected in the white-collar area, however, given
the relatively small numbers involved and the extent of prosecutorial discretion. Indeed,
against the costs of incarceration, a fiscally focused legislator will consider the
adjudicative and investigative savings that will flow from the coupling of a harsh
mandatory sentencing regime with a plea bargaining system. In a system in which
legislative provisions ostensibly threatening sentencing outcomes are really just an
“assignment of bargaining resources to the executive authorities,”67 even the legislator
not caught up in symbolic politics will be tempted to “print” freely the sentencing
leverage that prosecutors will use to “buy” information and guilty pleas from defendants.
The expense of pursuing white-collar investigations and prosecutions against wellresourced defendants makes this temptation particularly great. All of these factors
strongly counsel against resort to statutory mandatory minimums or indeed to any
unmediated legislative intervention.
Prosecutors, of course, will have similar reason to seek plea-bargaining leverage,
at least as an institutional matter. Indeed, the Justice Department’s forbearance in
seeking mandatory minimums in financial fraud cases is remarkable for this reason.68
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Perhaps the Department’s June 2010 letter to the Sentencing Commission was intended to
signal a readiness to reassess this forbearance in light of the sentencing leniency
permitted by Booker. Yet Judge Gleeson’s opinion in Ovid – responding to DOJ
complaints about low white collar sentences by noting prosecutorial participation in them
-- reminds us that prosecutorial interests are not monolithic, and that the negotiation
positions that line prosecutors take (which may actually reflect the exercise of this
leverage) can undercut the Department’s efforts to advocate at the wholesale level.
While the Bush Justice Department made a concerted effort, via the “Ashcroft
Memorandum” and other measures, to prevent line prosecutors from reducing ostensibly
rigid and severe sentencing provisions to bargaining chits,69 its lack of success and the
inherent challenges of hierarchical supervision of the adjudicative process makes it
inevitable that any mandatory system will be mediated by, and needs to be viewed
through the prism of, line-actor negotiation.
The inevitable intermediation of plea bargain poses a challenge not just to the
project of top-down legislative control but to the legitimacy of the sentencing numbers
that project specifies. When severe ranges are set with an eye to their reduction via
bargaining – for cooperation or mere guilty plea – the sentences of defendants with the
least to offer can end up outrageously high. This was the story – initially at least – of
Jamie Olis. Yet if they are not, prosecutors’ ability to extract guilty pleas and
information from defendant may be reduced. The justice of a regime that treats
punishments so instrumentally is of course contestable. What can’t be contested are the
unique enforcement opportunities that such a regime creates in the US and that no other
system has (in my opinion) duplicated. There is a cold brutality and inherent risk of
unreliability in the way we use the threat of vastly greater prison time to squeeze
information out of culpable defendants. But no equally effective tool for prying closely
held information about corrupt dealings (or other, less gentile forms of organized crime)
has been devised.70 Although, in the white-collar area, the clientele probably would be
ready to cooperate even without the kind of massive sentencing exposures they face
today, some degree of prosecutorial leverage (of the sort recognized everywhere except
criminal procedure doctrine as “coercion”) is needed.
Another source of the prosecutorial interest in rigidity takes us right back to
Kenneth Mann’s work in the 1980s and the perspectives of sentencing judges. To be
sure, judicial attitudes towards white-collar crime have doubtless changed considerably
since then. I suspect, for instance, that the new crop of judges is far more likely to treat
fraud and corruption as “real” crime than those on the bench in the 1970s. It may also be
that egalitarian sensitivities drive judges more now than before to use the sentences given
69
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to violent or “blue collar” offenses as reference points in white collar cases.71 Still, there
is some, but far from conclusive, evidence that some of the troubling factors influencing
sentencing in the 1970s remain active today. I’m especially struck by the sentencing
statistics in tax cases: Of the 660 tax offense sentencings in fiscal 2010, almost half were
“non-government sponsored below range.”72 My focus on these is contestable, since tax
enforcement is a politically fraught subject and so few tax cases are brought that any
prosecution may seem arbitrary. But in other respects they seem like the quintessential
white-collar cases: no identifiable victim, a defendant who can purport to be otherwise
upstanding (particularly now that the IRS has endeavored to bring fewer “Al Capone”
style pretextual prosecutions and more tax gap cases73), and diffuse benefits that don’t
flow to any particular district.74 An even starker pattern emerges from criminal antitrust
cases, where below-Guidelines sentences have become the norm since Booker.75 Recent
complaints from the Justice Department and legislators about leniency toward the wellheeled are probably overstated. But there’s not nothing to them.
The Promise of Advisory Guidelines
Reasonably soft sentencing guidelines -- of the sort envisioned by the Supreme
Court’s latest opinions – seem to offer the promise of a happy middle: loose strictures

Explaining why he had given a price‐fixing defendant an above‐Guidelines sentence, Judge Mark
Bennett – a regular source of thoughtful sentencing opinions ‐‐ recently noted

71
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protagonist in Victor Hugo's Les Miserables who was imprisoned for stealing a loaf of bread
to feed his widowed sister's seven children. . . . .Equally troubling is the fact that Vandebrake
is one of the few white collar defendants I have sentenced where the sentencing record is
totally devoid of any community work, participation in any service organizations, or
charitable giving. There is no record evidence of even a single good deed done by
Vandebrake for anyone other than his family. Vandebrake makes a mockery of the adage that
"to whom much is given, much is expected."
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that force judges to think hard about categorical deterrence and retributive determinations
but that leave decent space for well-reasoned retail sentence tailoring. Yet finding the
appropriate metric(s) has been (and may inevitably be) a challenge, particularly when one
moves away from “off the rack” cases of, say, internet or credit card frauds.76
Consider the recent options backdating prosecutions. Does one look to the stock
drop when the fraud was discovered? The loss to the firm, if there is one? The gain to
the backdating executive?77 In 2010, after initially getting a twenty-one month sentence,
winning on appeal and getting convicted again, the CEO of Brocade Communications
Systems was sentenced to eighteen months in prison.78 That same year, in another
option-backdating case, the prosecutor sought a six-and-a-half year sentence for a CEO
and noted: “’To promote respect for the law, the public must be assured that a wealthy,
well-connected individual, regardless of his station, array of prominent friends and
associates, history of private success or acts of public largesse, will be subject to the same
standard of criminal justice as those less fortunate.’” District Judge Otis D. Wright II
called the prosecution remarks “’mean- spirited and beneath this office,’” and sentenced
the defendant to eight months of home detention, $1 million fine, and 2000 hours of
community service.79 Whether the Sentencing Commission’s 2012 effort to address this
particular loss calculation problem80 remains to be seen.
The problem with using loss (or gain) as a sentencing metric is not simply that
arriving at such amounts can be difficult but that the time and effort spent it arriving at
them will case a shadow over the entire sentencing process, at the expense of other
factors, even those whose consideration is legally required. One can only speculate on
this anchoring bias. Perhaps it will be counteracted (depending on the procedural
framework and appellate case law) by a sentencing judge’s embrace of qualitative factors
in which she enjoys a special competence. Either way, there is a substantial likelihood
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that a preliminary quantifiable task will distort the larger qualitative project in which it is
embedded.81
As Judge (and my Columbia colleague) Gerard Lynch noted back in 2004, when
critiquing the inadequate guidance that the loss-driven Guidelines provided for his
sentencing of a securities trading assistant who defrauded his firm by making
unauthorized trades for his own accounts:
All else being equal, large thefts damage society more than small ones, create a
greater temptation for potential offenders, and thus generally require greater
deterrence and more serious punishment. But the guidelines provisions for theft
and fraud place excessive weight on this single factor, attempting -- no doubt in
an effort to fit the infinite variations on the theme of greed into a limited set of
narrow sentencing boxes -- to assign precise weights to the theft of different
dollar amounts. In many cases, including this one, the amount stolen is a
relatively weak indicator of the moral seriousness of the offense or the need for
deterrence. To a considerable extent, the amount of loss caused by this crime is a
kind of accident, dependent as much on the diligence of the victim's security
procedures as on Emmenegger's cupidity. Had Emmenegger been caught sooner,
he would have stolen less money; had he not been caught until later, he would
surely have stolen more. Nothing about the offense indicates that Emmenegger set
out to steal $ 300,000, no more and no less. Rather, he took advantage of his
position to steal various amounts from time to time.82
Yet once one moves away from formulaic metrics like “amount of loss,”
assessments of culpability are slippery.83 The lack of a clear metric for severity won’t
always redound to a defendant’s favor. The involvement of identifiable and grieviously
injured victims in the sentencing process may well have a significant effect.84 But
victims won’t always be so identifiably or sympathetic. And a court’s inability to adopt
some pre-specified measure to fit a crime can heighten the salience of a defendant’s
personal background (his deep roots in the community, acts of charity, etc.), with the
letters from well-wishers far outnumbering those from victims.
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That the defendant’s conduct likely could have been pursued as a regulatory (civil
enforcement) matter and that similarly situated individuals will surely have escaped
criminal prosecution will also complicate culpability assessments. Not only will
defendant be able to plausibly suggest that (notwithstanding the technical violation of the
relevant criminal statutes) this is “really” a civil case, but he can equally note that the
regulatory punishment will be sufficient. Moreover, while one hopes that the government
will have had good reason to select out the defendant for prosecution, explaining the
selection basis on the record may be difficult.85 The absence of a rigorously demarked
divide between the civil and the criminal, however bewailed,86 is a fundamental feature
of federal white collar enforcement is thus bound to exert a gravitation pull downward on
sentences.
One can easily imagine a thoughtful judge arriving at an appropriate “all things
considered” sentence in a world of non-binding or vaguely framed guidelines. The
challenge, however, is whether there can be any consistency across judges and more than
a pretense at intellectual rigor across cases.
The obvious solution to this problem would rely on the traditional common law
method, and look to iteration and deferential appellate review to shape legal
development. That current appellate opinions are rife with evidence or at least
allegations of inconsistency and inadequacy87 may simply be the product of the advisory
regime’s novelty, the disproportionately small number of white collar sentencings
(particularly the contested one that follow a trial) and the failure of the Justice
Department to fully engage in collaborative norm articulation. Perhaps we are simply in
an unsatisfying transition period that will end once prosecutors -- in those relatively few
(but very important) cases in which they are not aligned with defendants trying to sell a
plea deal to judges -- have useful things to say that go beyond the “loss”-driven
conversational rules of the Guidelines. Such nuanced conversations have surely started
to occur, but they cannot be managed or structured from afar. A decision to acquiesce in
or even encourage them would therefore require a formal allocation of authority to line
actors, and away from Washington. We should embrace this diminution of perceived
85
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“national uniformity,” as such “uniformity” has always illusionary, particularly in nonfungible white collar cases.
The relative infrequency with which non-fungible white collar cases are brought
will always limit our ability to develop stable, transparent, and fair sentencing doctrine.
So will the populist outrage that often attends (or sparks) bursts of white-collar
enforcement. The media lead-up to the recent sentencing of Raj Rajaratnam, convicted
after a much publicized insider-trading trial drives the point home. Would he get the 19
½ to 24 years sought by the government or the 6 years suggested by defense counsel?88
What would the “message” be about the seriousness with which his crimes would be
taken and those of like offenders pursued? So long as our political leadership is
incapable of sustained support for white collar enforcement, the main tool communicative
tool available to enforcers to show how "seriously" we take inside trading is a "serious"
sentence. In a federal system of sentencing inflation, where going rates are set by the
crimes that are regularly prosecuted, six years isn’t much and ten years just doesn't seem
that high.89 And so we back our way into a world where anything less than 10 + X years
gets taken as a signal of toleration. (Rajaratnam ultimately was sentenced to 11 years, a
$10 million fine, and the forfeiture of $53. 8 million by a judge who noted the
defendant’s good deeds and health issues.)90
Conclusion
Devising sentences for well-heeled defendants who have made undeniable
contributions to society even as they have abused the positions of trust and power they
have occupied would be a challenge even were one to put aside issues of power
allocation and political economy. Yet one cannot put aside such issues, particularly in a
system in which punitive white collar criminal enforcement takes an outsized role in
governmental responses to political and economic corruption and in which white collar
sentences are imposed in the context of a larger sentencing regime that is primarily
devised for those who have had fewer advantages and far fainter political voices. Having
returned to a world of considerable judicial discretion, all sentencing actors would do
well to attend to all these challenges. This is likely to be a long (and, one hopes,
uninterrupted) haul.
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